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Size and Scale Economies in  




The  Japanese  banking  industry,  including  the  cooperative  sector  has  been 
restructured  following  the  crisis  of  the  1990s.  Here  we  examine  the  relationship 
between size and scale economies of cooperative banks in Japan (namely Shinkin 
and  credit  cooperatives).  We  use  the  translog  cost function  methodology  and 
intermediation approach coupled with a large set of both cross sectional and panel 
data over the period 2003 to 2006. We find significant diseconomies of scale for both 
the full sample and sub samples of small and large cooperative banks. It is of interest 
to note that larger cooperative banks were at cost disadvantage as compared to 
small ones throughout most of the period. Thus, bigger is not always better. Shinkin 
and credit cooperative banks need to make further efforts to assess the business 
environment  and  strengthen  profitability  by,  for  example,  expanding  the  range  of 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In  recent  years,  the  global  banking  industry  has  been  through  a  period  of 
restructuring. The mergers and acquisitions boom in the sector has been based on 
the idea that “bigger is better”. More recent history has shown that even the largest 
banks have been unable to keep afloat without government help as the credit crisis 
has deepened. This of course reflects the way banks have managed, or failed to 
manage risk,  but  it  also  calls  into  question  the  notion  that  large  banks  are more 
efficient than small ones because they can exploit economies of scale and thereby 
reduce their costs.  
 
The  Japanese  banking  sector  experienced  crisis  in  the  1990s  and  has  emerged 
apparently better able to deal with major shocks. Japan has an enormous number of 
banks  including  a  thriving  cooperative  banking  sector  which  consists  of  relatively 
small  banks  (224  banks  and  1493  cooperative  type  financial  institutions  that  is, 
Shinkin, credit cooperatives,  labour banks, agricultural and  fisheries  cooperatives, 
Japanese Bankers Association as at 1 Apr 2008). 
 
This is a good time to study the Japanese cooperative banking sector in order to 
learn from the experience of a country that has already been through a banking crisis 
and a sub sector that has been relatively neglected in previous research. We study 
economies  of  scale  using  the  translog  model  and  find  that  there  are  significant 
diseconomies of scale in most size bands within the Japanese cooperative banking 
sector. This implies that bigger is not always better, at least in cost terms. While the 
wave of banking mergers in Japan cannot be explained as a means of exploiting 
economies of scale, perhaps it was instead a response to technological change.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on economies of 
scale in banking, highlighting the evidence on Japan. Section 3 gives an overview of 
the  Japanese  banking  system.  Section  4  discusses  the  methodology,  data  and 
definition  of  variables.  Section  5  presents  the  empirical  findings  and  section  6 
concludes the paper.  
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2. SIZE & SCALE ECONOMIES: A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE  
 
There is a broad literature and debate on the degree to which scale economies exist 
in banking, but most studies concentrate on the USA and Europe. Studies of US 
banking usually observe slightly increasing return to scale (i.e. economies of scale) 
among small banks and slightly decreasing returns (i.e. diseconomies of scale) at 
large banks. Despite divergences among researchers as to what comprise a bank’s 
outputs  and  inputs,  most  studies  have  concluded  that  there  are  no  important 
economies of scale in US banking (see Benston, Berger, Hanweck and Humphrey 
(BBHH), 1982; Gilbert, 1984; Hunter and Timme, 1986; Hughes, and  Mester, 1998). 
In  contrast  to  the  American  literature,  studies  of  European  banking  show  robust 
evidence  of  scale  economies  (Hardwick,  1989/90;  Altunbas  and  Molyneux,  1996; 
Richard Simper, 1999).  
 
The evidence for Japanese commercial banking suggests that size is relevant in that 
smaller banks are the ones that experience increasing returns in most time periods. 
The period under consideration is observed to be a critical factor in determining the 
results. For example, increasing returns to scale for banks of all sizes, including the 
largest  ones  were  observed  for  the  period  1980 1  and  early  1990s,  but  not  in 
between.  
 
Fukuyama (1993) reports that approximately 81% of Japanese banks experienced 
increasing returns to scale during the 1980s. This result was most pronounced in the 
small and medium size categories with just one third to a half of the largest banks 
experiencing increasing returns.  
 
Tadesse (2005) studies the cost structure of Japanese banks over the period 1974 to 
1991 and observes slight diseconomies of scale for large banks and significant scale 
economies for small banks. Using a cross section of banks in 1997, Drake and Hall 
(2003) find economies of scale were obtained only for smaller banks but not for the 
larger ones. Studies which account for risk (Altunbas et. al., 2000 and Hughes et. al., 
2001)  indicate  that  larger  banks  take  on  more  risk  and  that  explains  the 
diseconomies they experience. 
 ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance, DP2009-02 
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McKillop et al (1996) get slightly different results, obtaining economies of scale for all 
banks at sample mean for all years except for the late 1980s and onwards where 
constant returns prevail for all model specifications tested. They observe that Japan's 
largest banks demonstrate significant scale economies and attribute it to wide cross 
shareholdings  between  banks  and  other  financial  firms  in  Japan,  which  in  turn 
provide banks with lower monitoring costs for their lending portfolios on the back of 
their direct participation in the ownership of many Japanese commercial businesses. 
 
In contrast to the studies mentioned so far that use the translog model, Batchelor et 
al (2000) using the Fourier flexible form and a more recent data set (1992 8) find that 
the  average  cost curve  in  Japanese  banking  is  flat.  This  indicates  that there  are 
neither economies nor diseconomies of scale.  
 
Given that cooperatives are small, we would expect studies of this sector to provide 
similar  results  to  those  already  reported  for  small  commercial  banks.  Fukuyama 
(1996)  examines  the  nature  and  extent  of  both  technical  and  scale  efficiency  in 
Japanese credit associations by employing a nonparametric frontier approach for the 
year  1992.  Using  input based  measures,  he  observes  that  the  majority  of  credit 
associations (53.1%) were subject to decreasing returns to scale (DRS) while 43.9% 
of them operated with increasing return to scale (IRS). This result is confirmed in 
later  work  by  Fukuyama,  Guerra,  and  Weber  (1999)  who  analyse  the  overall 
efficiency and productivity growth of credit cooperatives in Japan during 1992 1996. 
They find that 73% of credit cooperatives were found to run in the range of DRS 
while  23%  function  in  the  reach  of  IRS,  with  the  remaining  4%  operating  with 
constant returns to scale.  
 
3. OVERVIEW OF THE JAPANESE BANKING SYSTEM 
 
There are three types of financial institution in Japan: the Central Bank, private and 
public  financial  institutions.  We  are  interested  in  a  small  subset  of  the  private 
depository institutions namely cooperative banks. 
 
It is important to recall that there has been lots of consolidation of the Japanese 
banking industry and the total number of Shinkin banks and credit cooperatives has 
fallen dramatically since 1980  as shown in table 1 below:  ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance, DP2009-02 
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Table 1
1980 2008
City Banks 13 6
Regional Banks 63 64
Shinkin Banks 462 280
Credit Cooperatives 483 164
Notes: Number of financial institutions in each category as of April 1, 2008
Source: Japanese Bankers Association  
 
Shinkin  banks  were  formerly  credit  cooperatives  before  being  converted  to  credit 
associations under the Credit Associations Law of 1951. Their members consist of 
local residents and small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). Total outstanding 
deposits  at  Shinkin  banks  as  of  March  31,  2008,  stood  at  ¥113,  000  Billion 
(equivalent to $1,135 billion), ranking third after the city and regional banks as shown 
in  Table  2.  Thus,  they  play  an  important  role  in  Japanese  financial  markets.  In 
addition to that, they enjoy a strong network as they have the biggest branch network 
spread throughout Japan. They are supervised by the Shinkin Central Bank.  
 
Like  commercial  banks,  Shinkin  banks  are  covered  by  deposit  insurance  and 
exposed  to  capital  adequacy  requirements  and  other  banking  regulations  and 
supervision. They differ from commercial banks in that they make loans mainly to 
member SMEs who capitalize the Shinkin banks. Shinkin banks can accept deposits 
from anyone whereas credit cooperatives can accept deposits only from members. 
Credit cooperatives are inspected by the prefectural governments while banks, credit 
associations,  securities  companies,  and  insurance  companies  are  under  the 
supervision of the Ministry of Finance. Shinkin banks are usually smaller than city 
and regional banks but larger than credit cooperatives as reflected by their deposit 
base as shown in Table 2 below:  
 
Table 2
Deposit Balance by Bank Segment
(As at March 31, 2008)
Billions of US dollar
City Banks 2,496
Regional Banks 1,952
Shinkin Banks 1,135                        
Agricultural Cooperatives 819
Second tier Regional Banks 554
Credit Cooperatives 163
Labor Credit Associations 151
Source: Shinkin Central Bank Report, 2008  ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance, DP2009-02 
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Credit  cooperatives  (also  known  as  Shinkumi  banks)  are  the  key  non profit 
cooperative financial institutions for regional finance in Japan. They are organized 
under  the  Law  for  Small  Business  Cooperatives  of  1949,  and  are  based  on  the 
mutual support of owners and workers of small and medium sized firms. They accept 
deposits  and  instalment  savings  from  members  of  the  cooperative,  government 
municipalities, public firms, and non profit organizations. They also lend and discount 
bills to members and certain non members, and join in payments associated with 
securities transactions.  
 
At the end of March 2008, there were 164 credit cooperative banks throughout 
Japan, with a total of 1,826 outlets, 3,673, 981 members, total deposits of ¥16,330 
billion (US$148 billion: ¥110= US$1), and outstanding loans of ¥9,382 billion (US$85 
billion). Japan’s credit cooperatives are governed by the Shinkumi Federation Bank 
(SFB) acting as their central bank. There are three types of credit cooperatives: 
regional, industry based and occupation based as shown below:  
 
Serve people that work at the same establishment, such as at
companies and government offices.
Type of Credit Cooperatives Activities
Industry based credit cooperatives
Occupation based credit cooperatives
Serve people engaged in the same profession, such as doctors 
Serve small and medium sized enterprises and residents




The Japanese banking sector went through a crisis in the late 1980 and 1990s. This 
followed the bursting of the asset price bubble affecting land and stock prices. During 
the  bubble  period,  the  banks  had  expanded  lending  and  now  found  themselves 
holding bad debts. The Shinkin banks and credit cooperatives were not immune to 
this problem (see Table 3). The government responded to the crisis by recapitalising 
some  banks,  encouraging  consolidation  in  the  sector,  and  introducing  a  deposit 
insurance system. It also took over the supervision of the Shinkin banks which had 
formerly been monitored by local government. 
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Table 3
Number of bankrupted depository institutions
a
Banks
b Shinkin Banks Credit Cooperatives Total
1990 0 0 0 0
1991 1 0 0 1
1992 0 1 0 1
1993 0 1 1 2
1994 1 0 4 5
1995 1 0 5 6
1996 2 3 3 8
1997 5 0 7 12
1998 3 1 31 35
1999 5 6 15 26
2000 1 5 27 33
2001
c 1 9 37 47
Total 20 26 130 176
a 
This table includes not only bank failures dealt with by the government, but also those privately disposed
b Includes city banks, regional I and II banks, trust banks and long term credit banks
c Figures for 2001 are as at November
Source: Hanazaki, M., and A. Horiuchi, (2003)  
 
4. ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Research Design Issues 
 
In working out the cost function of multi product firms such as banks, we are faced 
with the constraint of identifying the appropriate specification. Although there have 
been many studies on the subject, there is no generally accepted definition of the 
inputs and outputs of multi product financial firms.  
 
The two most popular approaches are the production and intermediation techniques. 
The production approach describes banking activities as the production of services 
for depositors and borrowers. Deposits and loans are counted as output; capital and 
labour as input and interest paid on deposits is not included in bank total costs.  The 
drawback of this approach is that it fails to pick up the economically more interesting 
role of a bank as a financial intermediary and exclude interest expense representing 
the largest share of total costs.  
 
In that respect, this study in common with many others opts for the intermediation 
approach,  originally  devised  by  Sealey  and  Lindley  (1977),  whereby  deposits ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance, DP2009-02 
 
  7 
combined with labour and capital are assumed to be utilised as inputs to produce 
loans and other earning assets as outputs. 
 
Most studies comparing the ‘translog’ and ‘Fourier flexible’ form find that the translog 
provides better prediction and is more stable, while the difference between the two 
forms  in  terms  of  results  is  negligible  (Berger  &  Mester,  1997;  Altunbas,  2001). 
Based on these, we plan to use the ‘Translog’ cost function.   
 
One  problem  that  arises  with  cost  studies  is  the  association  of  cost  among  time 
periods and output. In other words, this occurs when output produced in one period is 
recorded in another period. In that respect, in order to solve this issue, most cost 
studies are undertaken using annual data or cross sectional data.  
 
4.2 The Model 
 
Applying the duality properties, ‘translog’ cost functions are obtained by a second 
order Taylor series expansion of the cost function of the form:  
 
LnOC=f (LnQ1, LnQ2, LnP1, LnP2, LnP3)                  (a) 
 
Where OC : Operating Costs (including interest on deposit) 
             Qi : the ith output (total loans + other earning assets) ; i =1,2 and 
             Pj : the three jth input prices for labour, capital and deposits; j=1,2,3 
 
Following Kolari & Zardkoohi (1987), the ‘translog’ cost function for the case of this 
research is a log linear quadratic local approximation to the arbitrary multi product 
cost function specified in equation (a) around a point of expansion :   
 
LnOC =  α0 + α1 LnLOA + α2 LnEAR +  1 σ11 (LnLOA)
2 + 1 σ22 (LnEAR)
2  
                  2               2 
  + σ12 (LnLOA)(LnEAR) 
 
  + β1 LnPL + β2 LnPK+ β3 LnPDEP  
 
  + 1  11 (LnPL)
2  + 1   22 (LnPK)
2  + 1   33 (LnPDEP)
2  
     2                      2                        2 ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance, DP2009-02 
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  +  12 (LnPL)(LnPK ) +  13 (LnPL)(LnPDEP) + 23 (LnPK)(LnPDEP)  
   
  + ρ11 (LnPL)(LnLOA) + ρ12 (LnPL)(LnEAR)  
 
  + ρ21 (LnPK)(LnLOA) + ρ22 (LnPK)(LnEAR)  
 




OC  : Operating Costs (Sum of personnel expense, other operating expense and  
   interest on deposit) 
LOA  : Total Loans  
EAR  : Other Earning Assets including Deposits with banks, Public Bonds, Other 
investment and equity investment  
PL,K,DEP : Input prices for Labour, Capital & Deposits 
PL (Prices of labour)   : personnel expenses / number of employees 
PK (Prices of capital)   : Other operating expenses / fixed assets 
PDEP (Price of deposits): Interest expense on deposit / volume of deposit 
 
Inspecting equation 1, we can observe many of the characteristics of the translog 
cost function. In the first instance, it is obvious that the equation enlarges rapidly with 
any  additional  new  variable  and  entails  the  problem  of  degrees  of  freedom.  Our 
model includes 21 variables and a constant. If we were to add one more output, the 
model  would  expand  to  27  parameters.  This  characteristic  means  that  a  large 
database is required to run the model. The model assumes that some coefficients 
are the same by requiring symmetry conditions that  ij =  ji. Irrespective of the order of 
the interaction variable, N ij is regarded identical to N ji.  
 
Most studies using a translog cost function have included cost share factor equations 
to  minimise  the  problem  of  degrees  of  freedom  and  improve  efficiency  in  the 
estimation of the model. Consequently, using Shephard’s Lemma (Shephard, 1970; 
Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau, 1973), the associated cost share equations Si (The 
derived demand for input Xi) are then calculated by partially differentiating equation 
(1) with respect to the factor prices LnPi . ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance, DP2009-02 
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It is important to highlight that the parameters in the share equations are a subset of 
those in the translog cost function, and estimation of this system of equations results 
in more efficient  estimates than if we were to estimate Equation (1) alone. 
 
The Associated cost share equations are: 
 
SL = δLnOC / δLnPL = PL XL /OC 
 
     = β1 +  11 (LnPL) +  12(LnPK ) +  13(LnPDEP) + ρ11 (LnLOA) + ρ12 (LnEAR) + e 2         (2) 
 
SK = δLnOC / δLnPK = PK XK /OC 
     = β2 +   12 (LnPL) +   22 (LnPK) +   23(LnPDEP) + ρ21 (LnLOA) + ρ22 (LnEAR) + e 3       (3)  
 
SDEP = δLnOC / δLnPDEP = PDEP XDEP /OC 
 
        = β3 +   13 (LnPL) +   23 (LnPK) +   33(LnPDEP) + ρ31(LnLOA) + ρ32(LnEAR) + e4     (4)  
 
It  is  important  to  note  that  a  critical  property  of  a  valid  cost  function  is  that  it  is 
homogeneous of degree one in factor prices, i.e. the regression coefficients of the 
first order factor prices should sum to one.  Since the duality theorem requires that 
the  cost  function  must  be  linearly  homogeneous  in  input  prices,  the  following 
restrictions have to be imposed on the parameters of the cost function equation so as 
to adhere to one of the mentioned properties of a valid cost function (1):  
 
β1 + β2 + β3 = 1 ;     11 +  12 +  13 = 0 
 21 +  22 +  23 = 0        ρ11 + ρ21 + ρ31 = 0 
 ρ12 + ρ22 + ρ32 =0  and cross parameter restrictions  ij =  ji 
 
Since  the  cost  shares  sum  to  unity,  one  must  be  dropped  to  avoid  a  singular 
covariance matrix (Berndt et al., 1974). It does not matter which one is dropped but 
we choose  to drop  SK.  The estimated  cost functions above  provide the  basis for 
computing economies of scale. 
 
Differentiating the translog cost function Equation (1) with respect to outputs, gives 
the  measure  of  economies  of  scale  (SE)  i.e.  equation  (5)  in  which  we  use  the 
parameters from the estimated model and the means of the variables:  ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance, DP2009-02 
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           ^         ^               ^                                ^                                       ^                                  ^ 
  SE = (α1 + α2) + σ11 (LnLOA)
 2+ σ22 (LnEAR)
 2 + σ12 (LnLOA) + σ12 (LnEAR) 
  
             ^                               ^                            ^                            ^ 
           + ρ11 (LnPL) +  ρ12 (LnPL) + ρ21 (LnPK) + ρ22 (LnPK)  
                            ^                                 ^ 
                       + ρ31 (LnPDEP) + ρ32 (LnPDEP)        (5) 
 
If SE < 1       increasing returns to scale, IRS (i.e. Economies of scale exist) 
If SE = 1        constant returns to scale, CRS 
If SE > 1      decreasing returns to scale, DRS (i.e. Diseconomies of scale)  
 
Measures of economies of scale of banks are drawn from the derivative of a bank’s 
cost  with  respect  to  output  (loans  plus  other  earning  assets)  represented  by  the 
parameter estimates. The existence of economies of scale is understood as falling 
average  cost  of  producing  a  product  in  the  long  run  as  more  of  the  output  is 
produced. It is worth noting that Equation 5 is suitable to measure economies of 
scale subject to other regressors included in the cost function remaining unchanged 




The data sources were individual Japanese Shinkin and credit cooperative banks’ 
balance  sheets  and  income  statements  obtained from the  Fitch  IBCA Bankscope 
database from 2003 to 2006.  The sample comprises a large set of cross sectional 
and panel data of 293 banks over each of the four years under consideration so as to 
enable  consistent  cross sectional  comparison  over  the  years.  Shinkin  banks 
dominate the sample, comprising 71% of the total. The number of banks is limited by 
data availability. Given that a complete set of variables is expected for the analysis of 
the bank cost structure, many of the banks for which data was partially missing had 
to be dropped.  
 
The sample is then broken down into small and large cooperative banks based on 
their asset size. Small cooperative banks are classified as those having an asset size 
of less than $2 bn and large cooperative banks with an asset size above $2bn. Given ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance, DP2009-02 
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the selected intermediation approach, we use two categories of outputs and three 
types of input variables. All variables in this study are measured in US million dollars.  
 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Table  A1  of  Appendix  A  shows  the  summary  descriptive  statistics  to  give  some 
support to the results in next section. Several facts are noticeable at first sight from 
the table. On average, all variables showed an increase between 2003 and 2006, 
with both outputs and total assets registering the highest growth of 23% and 22% 
respectively. However, outputs, total assets and operating costs declined between 
2005 and 2006. This could result from bank closures, consolidation or technological 
progress. 
 
The translog cost function, assuming the intermediation approach in bank production 
is  being  applied.  Three  econometric  models  are  estimated:  (1)  SUR  analysis  for 
cross section studies (2) OLS for panel data (3) Fixed effects panel model. Using the 
intermediation approach in modelling the bank output/cost function, the first output is 
total loans and the second output is other earning assets. 
 
5.1 Scale Economies in Japanese Cooperative Banking 
 
Results of the Estimation using the Full Sample: All Cooperative Banks 
 
5.1.1 Cross Section Analysis  
The full sample representing balanced data has been reduced to 293 cooperative 
banks in each year so as to enable consistent cross sectional comparison over the 
years 2003 to 2006. It is then broken down into small and large cooperative banks 
based on their asset size. The sub sample is unbalanced data as we are interested 
in comparing small and large banks. It is noticeable that small banks dominate during 
the first two years representing 59% in 2003 and 54% in 2004, but they fall to 49% of 
the sample in both 2005 & 2006. 
 
Specifically, the cost function in equation (1) and two of the associated three share 
equations  (2)  and  (4)  are  estimated  simultaneously  using  Zellner's  Iterative 
Seemingly  Unrelated  Regression  (SUR)  technique  in  which  the  estimates  are ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance, DP2009-02 
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asymptotically  equivalent  to  maximum  likelihood  estimators  (Kmenta  and  Gilbert 
(1968)). 
 
SUR Analysis Estimates 
We  now  turn  to  the  main  focus  of  this  study,  namely  ‘To  what  extent  are  there 
economies of scale in Japanese cooperative banks?’. Table B1 of Appendix B shows 
the  translog  cost  function  estimates  obtained  from  regressing  the  system  of 
equations (1), (2) & (4) using SUR for the full cross section sample of Shinkin and 
credit cooperative banks in Japan. It can be observed that most of the parameter 
estimates  are  statistically  significant  at the  5%  level  for  all  years  and  overall  our 
model fits the data well with an with R
2 of 0.96, 0.96, 0.91 and 0.96 from 2003 to 
2006 respectively for the cost functions. 
 
The  system  of  equations  (1),  (2)  &  (4)  was  also  estimated  by  a  ‘full  information 
maximum  likelihood’  process,  but  as  there  was  little  difference  in  the  parameter 
estimates and the economies of scale measures, the results are not reported. We 
also carried out the two step test procedure (promoted by Harwick, 1989/1990) to 
examine whether there are any relationships between the residuals and the output 
variable in the translog cost function used in the analysis. Three regressions were 
estimated  using  the  residuals  from  the  translog  and  the  two  share  equations  on 
output  over  each  year  of  the  sample  as  shown  in  Table  A4  of  Appendix  A.  The 
coefficients were insignificantly different from zero for each regression. A final test for 
heteroscedasticity was also conducted and at 5% critical levels, the White (1980) test 
failed to reject the null of homoscedastic errors for all cooperative banks , small and 
large cooperative banks for all years except for full sample in 2003 and 2004 & 2006, 
and  large  ones  in  2004    (Appendix  A,  Table  A5.1).  In  conclusion,  the  conditions 
necessary for the function to be classified as flexible functional form are satisfied by 
most cooperative banks in Japan. 
 
Table 4 below shows the estimates of economies of scale, measured in accordance 
with expression (5), for the full sample. Diseconomies of scale (SE>1) are observed 
for all cooperative banks throughout 2003 to 2006 but at a decreasing rate. This may 
reflect the facts observed in Table A1 when describing the data, namely the decline 
in outputs, total assets and operating costs between 2005 and 2006. 
 ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance, DP2009-02 
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Table 4: Cross Section Scale Estimates : Japanese Shinkin & Credit Cooperatives






All banks (Full sample) SUR 2.72 0.96 2.78 0.96 1.72 0.91 1.34 0.96
SE
* >1 : Diseconomies of scale ; SE
*<1 : Economies of scale
2003 2004 2005 2006
 
 
5.1.2 Panel Data Analysis 
The Panel data technique analyses statistical data by combining both time series and 
cross section. According to Brooks (2008), there are some advantages of panel data 
as follows:  
(1) solves more problems than time series or cross section data separately 
(2)  enables us  to assess  the behaviour  of variables  or relationships  between 
them  over time 
(3) Minimises the problems that crop up with omitted variables when we embody 
variables with cross section and time series (more informative and variability, 
less collinearity, more degrees of freedom) 
 
The first technique used in panel data estimation is ordinary least squares (OLS). 
Panel  data  techniques  analyse  missing  components  as  either  fixed  or  random 
effects. The intercept for each of the individuals is not fixed. Thus the fixed effect 
model corrects this problem by including variables that lead the intercept to change 
cross sectionally  but  not  over  time.  On  the  other  hand,  Greene  (2003)  calls  the 
random effects model a regression with a random constant term. This is because one 
way to deal with the ignorance or error is to assume that the intercept is a random 
outcome variable. The random outcome is a function of a mean value plus a random 
error.  
 
For the full sample, we have adopted the ‘balanced panel’ approach, whereby each 
bank is always represented in each time period. A challenge in modelling a panel 
with long time dimension is that variables are likely to be non stationary. However, 
our sample has only four years time dimension. We thus investigate the nature of 
stationarity of our data by conducting unit root tests (Appendix A, Table A2). The test 
statistics reject the null hypothesis that the variables are non stationary. This may be 
due to the short time dimension of our panel data set. We also perform unit root tests 
on the residuals from the cost function (1) for the full sample and observe that the ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance, DP2009-02 
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cost function is balanced. Table A3 of Appendix A reports the Augmented Dickey 
Fuller (ADF) test, introduced by Maddala and Wu (1999).  
 
OLS/ Fixed Effect Estimates 
The  results  in  Table  C1  of  Appendix  C  correspond  to  a  panel  data  set  using  a 
translog  function  of  Japanese  cooperative  banks  over  the  four year  period  2003 
2006. Given the short time dimension of the data set, we do not add any time trend to 
capture any technological change over time.  
 
Initially, we run the tests using ordinary least squares (OLS). It can be observed that 
most of the parameter estimates are statistically significant at the 5% level for the full 
sample  and  overall  our  model  fits  the  data  well  with  an  R
2  of  0.95  for  the  cost 
functions. A. White Test (1980) for heteroscedasticity (Appendix A: Table A5.2) was 
also conducted and at 5% critical levels, it failed to reject the null of homoscedastic 
errors for all cooperative banks; both, small and large. To determine which model to 
use  (Fixed/Random  effects),  we  conducted  the  Hausman  specification  Test 
(Appendix A, Table A6) and observe that there is correlation between unobserved 
bank specific random effects and the regressors in the full sample, thus supporting 
the choice of the fixed effects model. 
 
Table 5 below shows the estimates of economies of scale, measured in line with 
expression (5), for the full sample using both OLS and fixed effects. We once more 
obtain diseconomies of scale for all cooperatives banks to the value of 1.88 and 2.30 
for both OLS and fixed effects respectively.  
 
Group Data Panel Model Full sample period 2003 2006
SE * R
2
All banks (full sample) OLS 1.88 0.95
Fixed Effects 2.30 0.99
SE
* >1 : Diseconomies of scale ; SE
*<1 : Economies of scale
Table 5: Panel Data Estimates : Japanese Shinkin & Credit Cooperatives
 
 
We will now consider possible explanations for the significant diseconomies of scale 
observed for Japanese Shinkin and credit cooperatives banks. Firstly, this may be 
due  to  the fact  that  both  Shinkin  &  credit  cooperatives  engage  primarily  in  small 
business lending, which entails significant monitoring costs, thus making it difficult to ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance, DP2009-02 
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exploit scale economies. It may also be attributed to their weak risk management and 
low profitability level.  
 
The sluggish improvement in earnings of Shinkin banks in FY2006 may also justify 
the decline in diseconomies of scale. The increase in interest income was offset by 
increases  in  credit  costs,  general  and  administrative  expenses.  (Bank  of  Japan 
Report, 2007). This may suggest that the motive behind mergers & consolidation 
among Shinkin & credit cooperatives was mostly for market power, so as to improve 
their ability to generate profits.  
 
It is important to recall that Shinkin & credit cooperative banks were also hit by the 
banking crisis and had excessive non performing loans. Thus they have not been 
immune to the subsequent restructuring. More than 175 depository institutions have 
failed  between  1990 2001  (Commercial  Banks  (20),  Shinkin  (26),  and  credit 
cooperatives (130)).  
 
5.2 Does Size Matter in Japanese Cooperative Banking?  
 
Results of the Estimation using Subsamples by Asset Size: Small vs Large 
Cooperative Banks 
 
5.2.1 Cross Section Analysis 
To get a better insight into scale economies, our next step is to investigate whether 
size matters in Japanese cooperative banking.  
 
SUR Analysis Estimates 
Table B2 and B3 of Appendix B show the translog cost function estimates obtained 
from  regressing  the  system  of  equations  (1),  (2)  &  (4)  using  SUR  for  the  cross 
section  sub sample  of  small  and  large  Shinkin  and  credit  cooperatives  banks  in 
Japan. Most of the parameter estimates are significant at the 5% level. 
 
From the  sub sample  estimates in  Table 6, significant  diseconomies of scale  are 
again obtained for both small and large cooperative banks throughout 2003 to 2006, 
except for small banks in 2005 where economies of scale (SE<1) were observed.  
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Table 6: Cross Section Scale Estimates : Japanese Shinkin & Credit Cooperatives






All banks (Full sample) SUR 2.72 0.96 2.78 0.96 1.72 0.91 1.34 0.96
Small banks SUR 1.67 0.90 2.12 0.89 0.79 0.79 1.21 0.89
Large banks SUR 6.07 0.92 3.02 0.91 3.77 0.85 2.50 0.93
SE
* >1 : Diseconomies of scale ; SE
*<1 : Economies of scale
2003 2004 2005 2006
 
 
We  can  see  that  scale  diseconomies  increase  as  cooperatives  banks’  size  gets 
larger within each annual sample. In other words, the small banks in the sample 
enjoyed  a cost advantage over the larger  banks as reflected by  the indicators of 
scale economies.  
 
5.2.2 Panel Data Analysis 
 
OLS/ Fixed Effect Estimates 
Table C2 and C3 of Appendix C show the results for small and large cooperative 
banks  using  the  translog  function  over  the  four year  period  2003 2006.  A  White 
(1980) test for heteroscedasticity  was also  conducted  and  at  5% critical  levels,  it 
failed to reject the null hypothesis of homoscedastic errors for both small and large 
cooperative banks. To determine which model to use, the Hausman Specification 
Test was performed and it is in favour of fixed effects model. It can be observed that 
most of the parameter estimates are statistically significant at the 5% level for the full 
sample for OLS regressions. In contrast, few parameters are significant when using 
fixed effects model. Overall our model fits the data well with an R
2 of 0.95 and 0.99 
for the cost functions using both OLS and fixed effects model respectively.  
 
Table 7 below shows the estimates of economies of scale, measured in line with 
expression (5), for the full sample using both OLS and fixed effects. For the large 
banks, the OLS and fixed effects results are consistent, indicating diseconomies of 
scale to the value of 4.12 and 1.64 respectively. Diseconomies are also observed for 
small banks, but only in the OLS model. 
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Table 7: Panel Data Estimates : Japanese Shinkin & Credit Cooperatives
Group Data Panel Model
SE * R
2
All banks (full sample) OLS 1.88 0.95
Fixed Effects 2.30 0.99
Small banks OLS 1.49 0.88
Fixed Effects 0.40 0.96
Large banks OLS 4.12 0.93
Fixed Effects 1.64 0.99
SE
* >1 : Diseconomies of scale ; SE
*<1 : Economies of scale
Full sample period 2003 2006
 
 
It can thus be noted from both cross section and panel data model estimates that 
once more those larger cooperative banks are at a cost disadvantage as compared 
to  small  ones.  This  suggests  that  it  may  be  more  cost  effective  for  Japanese 
cooperative banks to expand output at existing branches rather than by adding new 
branches. This may also indicate there is not much pressure for smaller banks to 
become larger through mergers and acquisitions or through internal expansion. This 
leads  us  to  question  why  cooperative  banks  merged  after  the  crisis.  As  a 
comparison,  these  findings  are  consistent  with  what  has  been  documented  by 
Fukuyama (1996) who obtained decreasing returns to scale for the majority of credit 
associations in 1992.  
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS & FUTURE DIRECTIONS  
 
The  comprehensive  restructuring  of  the  Japanese  banking  industry,  including  the 
cooperative  sector,  has  motivated  questions  about  its  economic  rationale.  Our 
contribution  to  the  debate  has  been  to  use  the  intermediation  approach  and  the 
translog functional form to model economies of scale during the period following the 
reforms. Our cross sectional and panel results indicate significant diseconomies of 
scale for the full sample and the two sub samples based on size. Larger banks are at 
a greater cost disadvantage than their smaller competitors. 
 
Nowadays,  with the credit crisis hitting the world’s economy, many of the world’s 
biggest banks are recommending limiting the size and scope of their business, and 
thus requesting more spending on technology and risk management. There has been 
some evidence  that technological progress accounts for the advantages of  large 
scale  production  in  the  industry.  Further  studies  should  investigate  the  impact  of ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance, DP2009-02 
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technology  on  scale  economies  of  Japanese  cooperative  banks  to  find  some 
rationale behind the recent trend in consolidation.  
 
One limitation of this study is that it ignores risk factors in the cost model. This study 
could  thus  be  extended  by  incorporating  the  risks  associated  with  Japanese 
cooperative  bank’s  operations  on  their  costs.  In  other  words,  testing  whether  the 
estimates of scale economies are increased or decreased once risk is taken into 
account. 
 
An  area  of  research  also  deserving  additional  attention  is  comparing  the  scale 
economies and size effects of Japanese Shinkin banks against commercial banks 
and credit cooperatives. It will also be of great relevance for research and policy 
purposes  to  see  if  the  Japanese  cooperative  banks’  results  carry  over  into  other 
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Table A1: Summary of key data
(US $ millons) Mean Median Std. Dev* Minimum Maximum
Input Prices L (PL)
2003 0.056805     0.057692     0.010448     0.000053    0.091789      
2004 0.062131     0.062497     0.009544     0.016043    0.100032      
2005 0.068395     0.066172     0.043516     0.025507    0.790992      
2006 0.063233     0.063122     0.009924     0.036254    0.111789      
Input Prices K (PK)
2003 0.373756     0.333333     0.286817     0.011587    4.000000      
2004 0.377501     0.333333     0.319981     0.000275    3.728787      
2005 0.374109     0.336275     0.043516     0.025507    0.790992      
2006 0.399521     0.339806     0.331390     0.000362    3.474519      
Input Prices DEP (PDEP)
2003 0.001562     0.001014     0.002239     0.000001    0.021924      
2004 0.001120     0.000811     0.001130     0.000170    0.010345      
2005 0.001207     0.000711     0.002061     0.000134    0.020491      
2006 0.001678     0.000685     0.011310     0.000189    0.193548      
Output 1 (LOAN)
2003 1,359.376    821.000       1,462.452    23.809        8,948.900     
2004 1,541.932    928.528       1,716.834    27.253        12,334.010   
2005 1,632.106    964.620       1,838.027    32.014        12,269.780   
2006 1,593.167    948.374       1,793.969    69.031        11,438.620   
Output 2 (EAR)
2003 1,112.857    663.368       1,610.143    24.630        22,176.030   
2004 1,318.777    807.146       1,908.633    26.580        26,316.860   
2005 1,463.856    890.992       2,166.866    51.272        30,229.420   
2006 1,440.676    878.805       2,146.165    51.675        29,766.980   
Total Assets (TA)
2003 2,590.102    1,595.203    2,931.657    114.119      27,699.720   
2004 2,996.134    1,846.424    3,450.099    133.790      31,832.210   
2005 3,246.492    2,039.216    3,766.120    128.425      35,397.360   
2006 3,161.633    2,002.755    3,696.816    125.742      34,601.730   
Operating Costs (OC)
2003 38.525         26.272         37.482         2.463          234.806        
2004 41.337         27.466         40.045         1.361          231.246        
2005 45.046         27.960         46.821         3.022          331.792        
2006 41.319         27.435         41.708         1.696          299.130        
* standard deviation
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Appendix A   Continued 
 
Unit Root Tests – Variables 
Table A2
 13.21878  13.20615  13.19677  26.20839  16.39942
 22.11801  30.6401  13.01377  14.02148  13.51302
 33.66247  12.97699  18.63976  31.77374
Test critical values: 5% level  is -2.8638
Deposit
t Statistic
Unit Root Tests on Variables (All are Stationary)
Earning  Assets Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test  Total Asset Fixed Assets Interest on Deposits
Augmented Dickey Fuller test statistic
Augmented Dickey Fuller test statistic









PDEP Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test 
 
 
Unit Root Tests on Residuals 
 
Table A3
Unit Root Tests on the Cost Function Residuals (Stationary)
t Statistic p value
Augmented Dickey Fuller test statistic  17.02299 0.00000
 2.863801
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test 
Test critical values: 5% level  
 
Testing the Relationship Between the Residuals and the Output Variable in the 








2 0.003265 0.006996 0.008854
t stats  0.976381  1.431815 1.612277
2004
R
2 0.00084 0.001767 0.002993
t stats  0.494722 0.717663 0.934723
2005
R
2 0.000179 0.00000 0.001242
t stats  0.228411 0.002603 0.60155
2006
R
2 0.000457 0.001364 0.004904
t stats  0.364882  0.630334 1.197484
Cross-section Sur Analysis
Share Equations
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Appendix A   Continued 
 
Tests for Heteroscedasticity 
All Japanese Cooperative Banks 2003 2004 2005 2006
Critical Chi squared at 5% critical value 71.42
Obs*R squared 202.49 94.17 16.82 111.50
Null hypothesis : Homoscedastic Errors Reject Reject Accept Reject
* Observed
Small Japanese Cooperative Banks  2003 2004 2005 2006
Critical Chi squared at 5% critical value 71.42
Obs*R squared 15.31 56.93 22.65 48.45
Null hypothesis : Homoscedastic Errors Accept Accept Accept Accept
Large Japanese Cooperative Banks  2003 2004 2005 2006
Critical Chi squared at 5% critical value 71.42
Obs*R squared 51.31 75.19 19.83 53.07
Null hypothesis : Homoscedastic Errors Accept Reject Accept Accept
Japanese Cooperative Banks Full Sample Small Large
Critical Chi squared at 5% critical value 71.42
OLS
Obs*R squared 15.54 17.98 28.48
Null hypothesis : Homoscedastic Errors Accept Accept Accept
Fixed Effects
Obs*R squared 15.62 19.02 27.71
Null hypothesis : Homoscedastic Errors Accept Accept Accept
Table A5.1 : White Test (1980) Cross section SUR Analysis




Hausman Specification Test 
 
Table A6
Test Summary Chi Sq. Statistic Chi Sq. d.f. Prob. 
152.665933 20 0
Test Summary Chi Sq. Statistic Chi Sq. d.f. Prob. 
41.66064 20 0.0031
Test Summary Chi Sq. Statistic Chi Sq. d.f. Prob. 
153.271103 20 0 Cross section random
Hausman Secification Tests










 ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance, DP2009-02 
 
  24 
 
Appendix B: Parameter Estimates of the Cross Section Models 
 
Variable
Cost Equations 2003 2004 2005 2006
Intercept 0.49598** 0.55607** 0.42149*** 0.47617**
(0.1449) (0.1327) (0.2406) (0.1645)
LnLOA 0.80511** 1.08652** 0.87413** 0.99197**
(0.1073) (0.0853) (0.1653) (0.1294)
LnEAR  0.03047  0.40123** 0.03712  0.26953*
(0.1055) (0.0919) (0.1737) (0.1272)
(LnLOA)
2  0.57361** 0.46753** 0.21813 0.03009
(0.0826) (0.0795) (0.1353) (0.1114)
(LnLOA)(LnEAR)  0.66071**  0.61954**  0.29612*  0.15111
(0.0812) (0.0824) (0.1310) (0.1009)
(LnEAR)
2  0.75736** 0.82745** 0.35275** 0.29208**
(0.0850) (0.0850) (0.1347) (0.1005)
LnPL 0.56475** 0.55731** 0.50915** 0.65567**
(0.0309) (0.0297) (0.0387) (0.0330)
LnPK  0.20393**  0.14566**  0.25036**  0.14210**
(0.0262) (0.0321) (0.0577) (0.0331)
LnPDEP  0.63918** 0.58835** 0.74121** 0.48644**
(0.0261) (0.0230) (0.0421) (0.0252)
(LnPL)
2   0.34722** 0.19396** 0.16770** 0.16463**
(0.0144) (0.0164) (0.0214) (0.0187)
(LnPK)
2   0.03555*** 0.04552**  0.04184* 0.06145**
(0.0206) (0.0117) (0.0190) (0.0152)
(LnPDEP)
2  0.23367** 0.24132** 0.31446** 0.14879**
(0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0137) (0.0088)
(LnPL)(LnPK )   0.18472**  0.08938**  0.05784**  0.11855**
(0.0098) (0.0129) (0.0172) (0.0134)
(LnPL)(LnPDEP)   0.16250**  0.10458**  0.10986**  0.04608**
(0.0102) (0.0099) (0.0131) (0.0110)
(LnPK)(LnPDEP)  0.14917** 0.04386** 0.01586 0.05710**
(0.0103) (0.0078) (0.0142) (0.0083)
(LnPL)(LnLOA)  0.02531 0.03097* 0.02198 0.01143
(0.0174) (0.0156) (0.0193) (0.0190)
(LnPL)(LnEAR)   0.07242**  0.06838**  0.06019**  0.03921*
(0.0178) (0.0153) (0.0189) (0.0185)
(LnPK)(LnLOA)  0.02369*  0.01511  0.02927*** 0.01851
(0.0105) (0.0106) (0.0171) (0.0112)
(LnPK)(LnEAR)  0.05260** 0.05522** 0.05559** 0.03558**
(0.0097) (0.0083) (0.0101) (0.0096)
(LnPDEP)(LnLOA)   0.04900**  0.01586*** 0.00729  0.02994**
(0.0105) (0.0086) (0.0133) (0.0105)
(LnPDEP)(LnEAR)  0.01981* 0.01316 0.00460 0.00364
(0.0088) (0.0083) (0.0106) (0.0098)
No. of observations (N) 293 293 293 293
R squared ( R
2) 0.956 0.961 0.913 0.959
Share Equations
R squared  Labour 0.477 0.373 0.186 0.236
                 Deposits 0.597 0.670 0.589 0.519
Note: *, **, ***,
 denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Coefficient
Table B1 : All Japanese Shinkin & Credit Cooperative Banks ( SUR Analysis)
Estimates from the Translog cost function obtained from regressing the system of equations (1), (2) & (4) using SUR analysis for the full
cross section sample are reported using the natural log of operating costs (LnOC) as the dependent variable. The columns report the
results obtained for Shinkin and credit cooperatives banks over the years 2003 to 2006. Independent variables for each bank include the
natural log of : outputs given by total loans (LnLOA) and other earning assets (LnEAR), inputs given by employee costs calculated as total
personnel expenses divided by the number of employees (LnPL), capital costs proxied by other operating expenses to fixed assets ratios
(PK), and interest paid on deposits calculated as interest expense on deposit divided by volume of deposit (PDEP).
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 Appendix B – Continued 
 
Variable
Cost Equations 2003 2004 2005 2006
Intercept 0.95110** 0.41372 0.68507 0.76212*
(0.3189) (0.3418) (0.6271) (0.3981)
LnLOA 0.66576** 1.03727** 0.29597 0.67001*
(0.2240) (0.2050) (0.3970) (0.2866)
LnEAR  0.24067  0.37700*** 0.45030  0.12004
(0.1900) (0.1973) (0.3955) (0.2582)
(LnLOA)
2  0.34189** 0.54206** 0.13781 0.14252
(0.1063) (0.1020) (0.1770) (0.1371)
(LnLOA)(LnEAR)  0.36833**  0.66411** 0.01794  0.13118
(0.1012) (0.1124) (0.1706) (0.1141)
(LnEAR)
2  0.53522** 0.86392**  0.18407 0.24244
(0.1261) (0.1351) (0.2445) (0.1650)
LnPL 0.47724** 0.40066** 0.36439** 0.50702**
(0.0515) (0.0513) (0.0786) (0.0613)
LnPK  0.18317** 0.03736  0.17726***  0.14185*
(0.0412) (0.0473) (0.1018) (0.0616)
LnPDEP  0.70593** 0.56198** 0.81287** 0.63482**
(0.0428) (0.0302) (0.0674) (0.0373)
(LnPL)
2   0.39142** 0.18593** 0.16144** 0.17935**
(0.0177) (0.0235) (0.0412) (0.0277)
(LnPK)
2  
0.04634 0.00202  0.03684 0.01840
(0.0425) (0.01960) (0.0574) (0.0214)
(LnPDEP)
2  0.24418** 0.23451** 0.31457** 0.25380**
(0.0120) (0.0118) (0.0192) (0.0124)
(LnPL)(LnPK )   0.20617**  0.06632**  0.03995  0.07739**
(0.0118) (0.0196) (0.0325) (0.0219)
(LnPL)(LnPDEP)   0.18525**  0.11961**  0.12149**  0.10196**
(0.0131) (0.0131) (0.0234) (0.0147)
(LnPK)(LnPDEP)  0.15983** 0.06430** 0.07679** 0.05899**
(0.0157) (0.0105) (0.0219) (0.0118)
(LnPL)(LnLOA)  0.03882*** 0.04291** 0.05170*** 0.04054
(0.0220) (0.0205) (0.0297) (0.0254)
(LnPL)(LnEAR)   0.05899*  0.03789***  0.04684  0.06308**
(0.0238) (0.0207) (0.0309) (0.0232)
(LnPK)(LnLOA)  0.02768***  0.03733*  0.03306  0.03226
(0.0160) (0.0160) (0.0344) (0.0221)
(LnPK)(LnEAR)  0.04658** 0.04419** 0.05965** 0.05136**
(0.0131) (0.0116) (0.0158) (0.0126)
(LnPDEP)(LnLOA)   0.06650**  0.00558  0.01865  0.00827
(0.0152) (0.0111) (0.0222) (0.0141)
(LnPDEP)(LnEAR)  0.01242  0.00630  0.01282 0.01172
(0.0116) (0.0118) (0.0185) (0.0133)
N 174 158 144 145
R
2 0.903 0.892 0.794 0.887
Share Equations
R squared  Labour 0.570 0.429 0.209 0.381
                 Deposits 0.629 0.763 0.622 0.744
Note: *, **, ***,
 denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Coefficient
Table B2 : Small Japanese Shinkin & Credit Cooperative Banks ( SUR Analysis)
Estimates from the Translog cost function obtained from regressing the system of equations (1), (2) & (4) using SUR analysis for the small cross 
section sample are reported using the natural log of operating costs (LnOC) as the dependent variable. The columns report the results obtained for
small Shinkin and credit cooperatives banks (asset size of less than $2 bn) over the years 2003 to 2006. Independent variables for each bank include
the natural log of : outputs given by total loans (LnLOA) and other earning assets (LnEAR), inputs given by employee costs calculated as total
personnel expenses divided by the number of employees (LnPL), capital costs proxied by other operating expenses to fixed assets ratios (PK), and
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Appendix B – Continued 
 
Variable
Cost Equations 2003 2004 2005 2006
Intercept 2.20825** 1.04621***  0.76038 0.03849
(0.8418) (0.6175) (1.2022) (0.8106)
LnLOA  0.25595 1.53271**  0.29549 0.65596
(0.3373) (0.3221) (0.5353) (0.4108)
LnEAR 0.02781  1.09109** 1.98747** 0.19057
(0.2877) (0.2882) (0.4789) (0.3645)
(LnLOA)
2  1.32374 0.16048 1.03073** 0.35092
(0.1196) (0.2052) (0.2375) (0.2195)
(LnLOA)(LnEAR)  1.08318**  0.44403**  0.76854**  0.36434*
(0.1625) (0.1710) (0.2127) (0.1654)
(LnEAR)
2  1.14956** 0.85521** 0.26527 0.38513**
(0.1472) (0.1380) (0.1999) (0.1317)
LnPL 0.85289** 0.86035** 0.63063** 0.96099**
(0.0809) (0.0760) (0.0808) (0.0759)
LnPK  0.29560**  0.37857**  0.41777**  0.18853**
(0.0741) (0.0781) (0.1173) (0.0709)
LnPDEP  0.44271** 0.51821** 0.78714** 0.22755**
(0.0520) (0.0643) (0.0971) (0.0549)
(LnPL)
2   0.18550** 0.19787** 0.15625** 0.11459**
(0.0209) (0.0226) (0.0241) (0.0218)
(LnPK)
2   0.02903 0.10020** 0.10838** 0.07453**
(0.0214) (0.01370) (0.0222) (0.0188)
(LnPDEP)
2  0.20505** 0.22700** 0.31923** 0.08512**
(0.0126) (0.0163) (0.0205) (0.0107)
(LnPL)(LnPK )   0.09742**  0.12329**  0.07478**  0.11767**
(0.0196) (0.0161) (0.01870) (0.01582)
(LnPL)(LnPDEP)   0.08807**  0.07458**  0.08147** 0.00308
(0.0110) (0.0151) (0.0164) (0.0136)
(LnPK)(LnPDEP)  0.06839** 0.02309*  0.03360*** 0.04314**
(0.0113) (0.0115) (0.0194) (0.0103)
(LnPL)(LnLOA)  0.04663*** 0.02752 0.00814 0.03376
(0.0200) (0.0216) (0.0308) (0.0199)
(LnPL)(LnEAR)   0.16315**  0.13236**  0.06302**  0.12436**
(0.0141) (0.0146) (0.0155) (0.0147)
(LnPK)(LnLOA)   0.00542 0.00127  0.01491 0.00273
(0.0269) (0.0282) (0.0283) (0.0281)
(LnPK)(LnEAR)  0.09557** 0.08333** 0.05018** 0.07480**
(0.0280) (0.0285) (0.0300) (0.0290)
(LnPDEP)(LnLOA)   0.04121**  0.02880** 0.00677  0.03649
(0.0139) (0.0182) (0.0258) (0.0171)
(LnPDEP)(LnEAR)  0.06758** 0.04903** 0.01284 0.04956**
(0.0153) (0.0150) (0.0159) (0.0149)
N 119 135 149 148
R
2 0.925 0.916 0.853 0.932
Share Equations
R squared  Labour 0.369 0.405 0.242 0.243
                 Deposits 0.681 0.585 0.569 0.385
Note: *, **, ***,
 denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Coefficient
Table B3 : Large Japanese Shinkin & Credit Cooperative Banks ( SUR Analysis)
Estimates from the Translog cost function obtained from regressing the system of equations (1), (2) & (4) using SUR analysis for the large
cross section sample are reported using the natural log of operating costs (LnOC) as the dependent variable. The columns report the
results obtained for large Shinkin and credit cooperatives banks (asset size above $2 bn) over the years 2003 to 2006. Independent
variables for each bank include the natural log of : outputs given by total loans (LnLOA) and other earning assets (LnEAR), inputs given by
employee costs calculated as total personnel expenses divided by the number of employees (LnPL),capital costs proxied by other operating
expenses to fixed assets ratios (PK), and interest paid on deposits calculated as interest expense on deposit divided by volume of deposit
(PDEP).
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Appendix C: Parameter Estimates of the Panel Data Models 
 
Variable
Cost Equations OLS Fixed Effects




LnEAR  0.04697 0.57033**
(0.0969) (0.1562)
(LnLOA)
2  0.33021** 0.55156**
(0.0614) (0.1158)
(LnLOA)(LnEAR)  0.33592**  0.65651**
(0.0580) (0.0947)
(LnEAR)






LnPDEP  0.44821** 0.29678**
(0.0622) (0.0643)
(LnPL)
2    0.20123**  0.11071**
(0.0522) (0.0415)
(LnPK)
2    0.10635**  0.01723
(0.0252) (0.0250)
(LnPDEP)
2  0.01843  0.03436**
(0.0181) (0.0163)
(LnPL)(LnPK )  0.03638  0.05768*
(0.0328) (0.0274)
(LnPL)(LnPDEP)  0.16485** 0.16840**
(0.0285) (0.0246)
(LnPK)(LnPDEP)  0.06997** 0.07491**
(0.0254) (0.0218)
(LnPL)(LnLOA)   0.19368**  0.27401**
(0.0399) (0.0457)
(LnPL)(LnEAR)  0.21681** 0.30743**
(0.0404) (0.0455)
(LnPK)(LnLOA)  0.06974*** 0.12544**
(0.0486) (0.0545)
(LnPK)(LnEAR)   0.04600  0.13474**
(0.0525) (0.0608)
(LnPDEP)(LnLOA)  0.12394** 0.14857**
(0.0298) (0.0337)






Note: *, **, ***,
 denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Coefficient
Table C1 : All Japanese Shinkin & Credit Cooperative Banks 
Estimates from the Translog cost equation (1) using OLS and fixed effects analysis for the full panel data sample are reported
using the natural log of operating costs (LnOC) as the dependent variable. The columns report the results obtained for Shinkin and
credit cooperatives banks over the years 2003 to 2006. Independent variables for each bank include the natural log of : outputs
given by total loans (LnLOA) and other earning assets (LnEAR), inputs given by employee costs calculated as total personnel
expenses divided by the number of employees (LnPL), capital costs proxied by other operating expenses to fixed assets ratios (PK),
and interest paid on deposits calculated as interest expense on deposit divided by volume of deposit (PDEP).
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Appendix C – Continued 
 
Variable





LnEAR  0.25569 0.03937
(0.2368) (0.3326)
(LnLOA)
2  0.31545**  0.08915
(0.0919) (0.2037)
(LnLOA)(LnEAR)  0.23336* 0.20978
(0.0915) (0.2616)
(LnEAR)




LnPK  0.20520  0.26602**
(0.1587) (0.0450)







2    0.21327**  0.03699
(0.0525) (0.0477)
(LnPDEP)
2  0.14029** 0.07991
(0.0424) (0.0630)
(LnPL)(LnPK )  0.17340*  0.09467*
(0.0759) (0.0456)
(LnPL)(LnPDEP)  0.10600*** 0.02860
(0.0559) (0.0794)
(LnPK)(LnPDEP)  0.03987 0.13166**
(0.0536) (0.0073)
(LnPL)(LnLOA)   0.01341  0.24208**
(0.0681) (0.0682)
(LnPL)(LnEAR)   0.05082 0.21827***
(0.0764) (0.0580)
(LnPK)(LnLOA)  0.04920 0.10379
(0.0851) (0.0837)
(LnPK)(LnEAR)  0.08552 0.03277
(0.1092) (0.1144)
(LnPDEP)(LnLOA)   0.03580 0.13829
(0.0560) (0.0970)






Note: *, **, ***,
 denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Coefficient
Table C2 : Small Japanese Shinkin & Credit Cooperative Banks 
Estimates from the Translog cost equation (1) using OLS and fixed effects analysis for the small panel data sample are reported using
the natural log of operating costs (LnOC) as the dependent variable. The columns report the results obtained for small Shinkin and credit
cooperatives banks (asset size of less than $2 bn) over the years 2003 to 2006. Independent variables for each bank include the natural
log of : outputs given by total loans (LnLOA) and other earning assets (LnEAR), inputs given by employee costs calculated as total
personnel expenses divided by the number of employees (LnPL), capital costs proxied by other operating expenses to fixed assets ratios
(PK), and interest paid on deposits calculated as interest expense on deposit divided by volume of deposit (PDEP).
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Appendix C – Continued 
 
Variable
Cost Equations OLS Fixed Effects
Intercept 0.85703 3.26669**
(0.6079) (1.319)





2  0.99190** 0.64946**
(0.1027) (0.1555)
(LnLOA)(LnEAR)  0.78979**  0.23701
(0.0999) (0.1706)
(LnEAR)




LnPK  1.45190**  0.43185
(0.2680) (0.5531)
LnPDEP  0.89628** 1.25833**
(0.1792) (0.3323)
(LnPL)
2    0.21957**  0.25945
(0.0624) (0.0717)
(LnPK)
2   0.61830** 0.18331
(0.0707) (0.1444)
(LnPDEP)
2   0.03151  0.08146
(0.0236) (0.0298)
(LnPL)(LnPK )   0.37460**  0.08425**
(0.0793) (0.1563)
(LnPL)(LnPDEP)  0.59417** 0.34370*
(0.0654) (0.1418)
(LnPK)(LnPDEP)   0.24370**  0.09906
(0.0458) (0.0981)
(LnPL)(LnLOA)  0.24774* 0.08996
(0.0698) (0.0881)
(LnPL)(LnEAR)   0.21411*** 0.18445
(0.0919) (0.1304)
(LnPK)(LnLOA)   0.26952**  0.02760
(0.1043) (0.1543)
(LnPK)(LnEAR)  0.34407** 0.06559
(0.1120) (0.1489)
(LnPDEP)(LnLOA)  0.02178  0.06236
(0.0744) (0.1510)






Note: *, **, ***,
 denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Coefficient
Table C3 : Large Japanese Shinkin & Credit Cooperative Banks 
Estimates from the Translog cost equation (1) using OLS and fixed effects analysis for the large panel data sample are reported using
the natural log of operating costs (LnOC) as the dependent variable. The columns report the results obtained for large Shinkin and
credit cooperatives banks (asset size above $2 bn) over the years 2003 to 2006. Independent variables for each bank include the
natural log of : outputs given by total loans (LnLOA) and other earning assets (LnEAR), inputs given by employee costs calculated as
total personnel expenses divided by the number of employees (LnPL), capital costs proxied by other operating expenses to fixed assets
ratios (PK), and interest paid on deposits calculated as interest expense on deposit divided by volume of deposit (PDEP).
 
 